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Abstract 
We examine the association between asymmetric information and tax-motivated income shifting 
via patents in a setting of incomplete information. As the value of patents is often firm-specific, 
the local tax authority lacks information on comparable transactions when assessing a 
multinational corporation’s (MNC’s) transfer-pricing strategies, leading to information asymmetry 
between the MNC and the local tax authority. Using a sample of affiliates of European MNCs and 
employing the relative share of patents held by an MNC as a measure for asymmetric information, 
we show that tax-motivated income shifting increases in information asymmetry. We also find that 
more external comparable information available to the local tax authority and stricter tax 
enforcement mitigate this relation. In contrast, more extensive transfer-pricing documentation 
requirements are less effective in this setting. Overall, our results suggest that the level of 
comparable information is an important determinant of tax-motivated income shifting via patents. 
The effectiveness of tax-policy measures in curbing income shifting critically depends on their 
ability to increase the set of comparable information. 
 
 
- 1 - 
1. Introduction 
There is broad agreement in academic research and the public debate that multinational 
corporations (MNCs) reduce their worldwide tax burden by shifting taxable income across 
borders and by relocating economic activity to low-tax jurisdictions (see Dharmapala (2014) and 
Riedel (2018) for reviews of the literature). In this regard, recent policy initiatives, such as the 
OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2015b) and the Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax (IMF et al. 2017), perceive patents to be the key mechanism for income 
shifting because their value is hard to determine for tax purposes. While prior research provides 
evidence for the extent to which MNCs use patents to shift income (Grubert 2003; Griffith, 
Miller, and O’Connell 2014; Beer and Loeprick 2015), the role of comparable information for 
the valuation of intra-firm royalty payments has received little attention. In this paper, we study 
whether and to what extent asymmetric information between an MNC and the local tax authority 
is associated with tax-motivated income-shifting via patents. In addition, we examine whether 
tax-policy measures designed to curb tax-motivated income shifting mitigate this relation.  
For tax purposes, an MNC is supposed to charge a price for an intra-firm transaction that is 
comparable to similar transactions between unrelated parties (OECD 2017a). To justify this 
“arm’s length” transfer price, an MNC could draw on comparable information from its own 
transactions with unrelated parties or from economically similar transactions (De Simone 2016; 
IMF et al. 2017). The tax authority, on the other hand, requires external comparable information 
to benchmark the transfer price determined by the MNC against the price for transactions 
between unrelated parties (OECD 2017a). Comparable information for intra-firm transactions 
involving royalty payments for the use of patents is scarce (De Waegenaere, Sansing, and 
Wielhouwer 2012; De Simone and Sansing 2018). Thus, the “true” economic value of royalty 
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payments could be difficult to determine and both the MNC and the local tax authority have 
incomplete information about the precise value of the transaction.1 However, since the value of 
patents is often firm specific and the MNC owning the asset possesses specific knowledge about 
the underlying value drivers, the MNC has a more complete information set than the local tax 
authority (Blair-Stanek 2015; Gallemore, Huang, and Wentland 2018). As a result, information 
asymmetry between the parties emerges, making it more difficult for the local tax authority to 
assess the arm’s length price. Thus, asymmetric information could reduce the likelihood that the 
local tax authority detects and challenges an aggressive tax-position and we expect tax-motivated 
income shifting to increase in information asymmetry.  
Examining this relation is important because tax practices of MNCs that involve patents 
have gained public attention and the amounts of taxes allegedly avoided are significant. For 
instance, GlaxoSmithKline saved $3.4 billion in taxes by paying intra-firm royalties to low-tax 
jurisdictions (Matthews and Whalen 2006). Amazon in Luxembourg, Starbucks in the 
Netherlands, and Apple in Ireland used similar structures, with the latter resulting in tax savings 
of $14 billion (Chee 2019). Further, several countries currently take actions to curb tax-
motivated income shifting, for instance, by introducing documentation requirements (Lohse and 
Riedel 2013) or by tightening tax enforcement (De Simone, Stomberg, and Williams 2019). The 
design of effective tax-policy measures requires a profound understanding of the factors that 
enable MNCs to shift income.  
While an MNC could hold several forms of intangible assets, we focus on income shifting 
via patents for three reasons. First, tax-policy initiatives and public tax cases perceive patents to 
                                                 
1 A similar economic problem of information asymmetry under incomplete information arises for example also in 
emissions taxation (Baron 1985) or knowledge transfer in a sender-receiver framework (Lin, Geng, and Whinston 
2005). 
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be the main intangible asset MNCs use to shift income (OECD 2015). The OECD BEPS Action 
Plan, for instance, identifies royalty payments on patents as a major source of base erosion in 
high-tax jurisdictions and provides guidance for policy makers to limit this form of income 
shifting. Second, patents are regularly granted to and held by foreign affiliates of MNCs while 
tax and legal restrictions imply that other intangible assets, such as trademarks, are more strongly 
concentrated in the home country of the MNC (Heckemeyer, Olligs, and Overesch 2018). The 
wider distribution of patents within MNCs provides opportunities to shift income and to exploit 
country-level differences in corporate income tax rates (Karkinsky and Riedel 2012; Griffith et 
al. 2014). Third, unlike other forms of intangible assets, such as trade secrets or know-how, 
patents are publicly disclosed to protect an invention and thus observable in archival datasets. 
To examine the relation between information asymmetry and tax-motivated income 
shifting, we use affiliate-level unconsolidated financial statement data from Bureau van Dijk’s 
Orbis database. We link this data with the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT, 
providing detailed information on patent owners, applications, grants, and citations. We measure 
asymmetric information associated with patents through affiliate-level patent concentration. 
Specifically, for each affiliate, we divide the number of patents held by all affiliates of an MNC 
by the sum of patents held by other MNCs with affiliates operating in the same country-industry-
year.2 This measure is based on the following intuition: if an MNC holds a large share of patents, 
comparable information on royalty payments is scarce, which facilitates income shifting from a 
non-patent-holding affiliate to a foreign affiliate that holds patents (see Figure 1). We focus on 
this outbound shifting mechanism because external comparable information is most critical for 
                                                 
2 By conditioning on MNCs in the same country-industry-year, we rule out that different patenting strategies across 
industries affect our measure (Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and Sena 2014). 
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tax authorities assessing the royalty payments of non-patent holding affiliates (OECD 2015b). 
We include this measure in a modified version of the income-shifting model developed by 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and recently extended by De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017). 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that tax-motivated income shifting increases in the 
level of asymmetric information. This effect is also economically significant: a one standard 
deviation increase in patent concentration implies a 25.6 percent higher elasticity of an affiliate’s 
return on assets to income-shifting incentives induced by differences in corporate income tax 
rates. We also find a higher sensitivity to incremental income-shifting incentives associated with 
intellectual property (IP) box regimes providing preferential tax rates on IP income. These results 
hold when calculating patent concentration using patent citations as a proxy for the value of 
patents, when applying the statutory corporate income tax rate in the affiliate country to capture 
income-shifting incentives, and when excluding loss affiliates. Thus, our results suggest that the 
level of asymmetric information between an MNC and the local tax authority over how to value 
royalty payments is an important determinant of tax-motivated income shifting via patents.  
We next explore whether potential alternative sources of information available to the local 
tax authority mitigate the association documented in our baseline tests. First, local tax authorities 
could benchmark profit margins of foreign affiliates receiving royalty payments against those of 
local patent holding affiliates to detect and challenge potentially aggressive transfer-pricing 
strategies. As expected, we find that more external comparable information in the form of local 
patent-holding affiliates mitigates the relation found in our baseline tests. This result suggests 
that more external comparable information dampens tax-motivated income shifting via patents. 
Further, variation in the effect of information asymmetry conditional on the extent of external 
comparable information available to the local tax authority supports the argument that our 
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measure is likely to capture asymmetric information between the MNC and the local tax 
authority. Second, we examine whether tax-policy measures designed to curb income shifting 
have a similar effect. For instance, the information set of a local tax authority could increase if 
the MNC is required to provide more extensive documentation for its transfer-pricing strategies. 
Exploiting the adoption of transfer-pricing documentation requirements, we find less income 
shifting on average. However, these rules have only a weak mitigating effect on the association 
between patent concentration and income shifting since they do not directly increase the set of 
comparable information. Thus, the effectiveness of transfer-pricing documentation requirements 
depends on their ability to reduce asymmetric information between an MNC and the local tax 
authority.  
We also explore whether our main findings are due to asymmetric information lowering 
the likelihood that an aggressive tax-position is detected and successfully challenged by local tax 
authorities. To test this, we follow De Simone et al. (2019) and examine whether an increase in 
country-level tax enforcement mitigates our baseline association. We do not find a mitigating 
effect for an increase in overall tax administration expenditures as a proxy for the perceived level 
of tax enforcement. However, higher values of completed tax assessments and more staff used in 
tax audits, which suggest an increase in actual tax enforcement, mitigate the relation between 
patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting. These results indicate that asymmetric 
information between an MNC and the local tax authority lowers the likelihood of detecting and 
successfully challenging an aggressive tax-position, shaping the extent to which MNCs shift 
income via patents. 
We conduct additional tests to rule out alternative explanations and to further validate our 
measure. First, since patent concentration could be correlated with the market share of an 
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affiliate in the country-industry-year in which it operates, our results could also reflect income 
shifting associated with market power. After adding interaction terms between market power and 
variables that capture income-shifting incentives, we continue to find that patent concentration is 
associated with more income shifting, alleviating concerns that our proxy might capture an 
affiliate’s market power. Second, we examine income shifting via debt as a falsification test 
since information asymmetry associated with patents should have no effect in this setting. 
Consistent with this expectation, we find no association between patent concentration and this 
income-shifting channel. This result provides comfort that our measure captures asymmetric 
information associated with patents. Third, we examine affiliates that hold patents and document 
that the level of asymmetric information is also associated with the extent to which an MNC 
shifts income via patents to a particular patent-holding affiliate. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we expand research on the 
determinants of tax-motivated income shifting (Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003; Clausing 2003; 
Grubert 2003; Markle 2016; De Simone et al. 2017; Blouin, Robinson, and Seidman 2018) by 
showing that the extent of asymmetric information between an MNC and the local tax authority 
is an economically important determinant of income shifting via patents. Prior findings by De 
Simone (2016) indicate that less comparable information constrains an MNC’s ability to justify 
aggressive transfer-pricing strategies, which is associated with less tax-motivated income 
shifting. Our results, in contrast, suggest that, because the value of patents is firm-specific, less 
comparable information facilitates income shifting in this setting. More generally, since the level 
of asymmetric information depends on the distribution of patents within an industry, our results 
also highlight that industry landscapes shaped by the number of comparable assets or firms 
determine the extent to which MNCs can shift income.  
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Second, we contribute to research on the effectiveness of tax-policy measures designed to 
limit tax-motivated income shifting. While Joshi et al. (2018) and Joshi (2019) find that the 
mandated disclosure of tax-related information reduces tax-motivated income shifting on 
average, our results suggest that tax-policy measures that effectively curb income shifting via 
patents need to be targeted. Specifically, these policy measures have to increase either the set of 
comparable information or the likelihood that the tax authority might detect and successfully 
challenge an aggressive tax position. More extensive transfer-pricing documentation 
requirements that do not directly increase the level of comparable information are unlikely to 
limit the extent to which MNCs shift income via patents.  
Finally, our findings inform studies that examine specific income-shifting channels. While 
prior studies focus on tax incentives associated with statutory corporate income tax rates (e.g., 
Grubert 2003; Clausing 2003; Dharmapala and Riedel 2013; Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017; 
Blouin et al. 2018), our findings imply that researchers need to incorporate the incremental tax 
incentives induced by IP box regimes in their empirical models to detect income shifting via 
patents. Tests that exclusively focus on income-shifting incentives associated with differences in 
statutory corporate income tax rates might be insufficient to achieve this goal.  
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Standard 
While market forces determine the prices for transactions between unrelated enterprises, an 
MNC has to value intra-firm transactions for tax purposes by applying a transfer price. The 
OECD defines a transfer price as “the price at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and 
intangible property or provides services to associated enterprises” (OECD 2010). According to 
the OECD guidelines, the applicable transfer price has to follow the “arm’s length standard” 
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(OECD 2017a). Most countries adopted this principle in domestic tax law and in their double tax 
treaties (IMF et al. 2017). The principle requires the price charged for an intra-firm transaction 
(“controlled transaction”) to be comparable to prices charged between unrelated parties for 
similar transactions entered into under similar economic circumstances (OECD 2017a). The 
arm’s length standard should constrain tax-motivated income shifting and ensure that the 
allocation of taxable income across taxing jurisdictions is in line with economic activity and 
value creation. 
The OECD transfer-pricing guidelines provide several methods an MNC may apply to 
fulfill the arm’s length standard (OECD 2017a).3 Based on the nature of the transaction, an MNC 
chooses the most appropriate method, which requires an analysis of the functions, assets, and 
risks borne by the affiliates involved in the transaction (OECD 2017a). All methods have in 
common that they require information on comparable uncontrolled transactions to determine key 
inputs, such as mark-ups or profit margins, for deriving the arm’s length transfer price. The 
MNC could obtain this information from its own transactions with unrelated enterprises 
(“internal comparable”) or from transactions between comparable unrelated enterprises 
(“external comparable”). The latter includes firms operating in the same industry, performing 
similar functions, and bearing risks similar to the MNC (OECD 2017a). If information on 
comparable uncontrolled transactions is unavailable, the MNC may determine the arm’s length 
transfer price by applying different valuation techniques (OECD 2017).  
In addition to determining the arm’s length price, an MNC could also use information on 
comparable uncontrolled transactions to justify the transfer price and to resolve disputes with the 
local tax authority. De Simone (2016), for instance, examines the introduction of International 
                                                 
3 All jurisdictions apply either traditional transaction methods or cost plus methods.  
- 9 - 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in several European countries as a setting that increased 
the set of comparable information. Her results indicate that more comparable information could 
allow an MNC to substantiate aggressive transfer-pricing strategies and to shift more income. 
However, the extent of information available for comparable uncontrolled transactions 
depends on the nature of the transaction. For tangible goods or services sold on external markets, 
market or resale prices are readily observable for the MNC and the tax authority (IMF et al. 
2017). In contrast, for goods and services without an external market and for assets whose value 
is firm specific, external information on comparable transactions may not exist or be difficult to 
obtain (De Waegenaere et al. 2012; De Simone and Sansing 2018). This applies in particular to 
patents as these assets are often unique to the firm. Further, an MNC owning the patent has 
greater knowledge about its innovative character and the underlying value drivers (Qiu and Wan 
2015; Gallemore et al. 2018). Consequently, patents are considered as hard to value for transfer-
pricing purposes, posing a challenge to the arm’s length standard and to tax authorities assessing 
an MNC’s transfer-pricing strategies (IMF et al. 2017).  
2.2 Patents and Tax-Motivated Income Shifting  
The nature of its operations enables an MNC to shift taxable income into low-tax 
jurisdictions by means of tax-deductible intra-firm interest or royalty payments, and by 
exploiting discretion in setting transfer prices for these payments.4 Recent tax-policy initiatives, 
such as the OECD BEPS Action Plan (OECD 2015) identify cross-border income shifting as the 
prevalent strategy for MNCs to reduce their worldwide tax burden. Moreover, several studies 
                                                 
4
 The OECD BEPS Action Plan notes that MNCs exploit discretion in setting transfer prices to deviate from the arm’s 
length standard and to reap tax benefits (OECD 2015). This issue has become increasingly relevant in recent years as 
countries adopted preferential tax regimes for profits derived from intangibles (see e.g., Evers, Miller, and Spengel 
2015; Bornemann, Laplante, and Osswald 2019). These regimes provide substantial tax benefits for profits from 
royalty payments with tax rates ranging from zero (Malta) to 17 percent (France). 
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document that reported profits of MNCs are sensitive to tax incentives (e.g., Hines and Rice 
1994; Grubert and Mutti 2000; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Klassen and Laplante 2012; De 
Simone 2016; Markle 2016). 
Action 8 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan posits that royalty payments for the intra-firm 
use of patents are a major channel for cross-border income shifting (OECD 2015b) and prior 
research applies different approaches to identify this behavior.5 One stream of research studies 
the relation between corporate income tax rates and locational choices for patents. Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) document a negative association between 
the applicable statutory tax rate and the level of intangible investment as well as the number of 
patent applications filed in a particular country. Similarly, Griffith et al. (2014) show that MNCs 
strategically locate valuable patents in countries with preferential tax regimes in order to shift 
income via royalty payments.  
Another stream of research more directly examines an MNC’s transfer-pricing strategies 
and finds that MNCs respond to tax-rate differentials by adjusting intra-firm transfer prices. This 
result is concentrated in MNCs with high levels of intangible assets and greater organizational 
complexity (Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003; Clausing 2003). Several studies also show that 
reported profits are responsive to IP or R&D related tax incentives. Grubert (2003) finds that 
profits of U.S. MNCs respond to income-shifting incentives and that this effect is stronger for 
R&D intensive firms. De Simone, Huang, and Krull (2017) find a positive association between 
foreign profit margins and domestic R&D activity, consistent with MNCs using intangible assets 
for tax-motivated income shifting. Bornemann, Laplante, and Osswald (2019) exploit the 
                                                 
5 Prior literature also documents that MNCs use tax-efficient financial structures as an income-shifting channel 
(Dharmapala 2014; Riedel 2018; Hopland, Lisowsky, Mardan, and Schindler 2018). In a meta-analysis, Heckemeyer 
and Overesch (2017), however, identify transfer pricing and licensing as the main drivers of income shifting. 
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introduction of IP box regimes and find the strongest reduction in effective tax rates for MNCs 
without income-shifting opportunities.  
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Tax-deductible royalty payments for the use of patents enable MNCs to generate tax 
savings by shifting income across borders. As outlined above, an MNC has to apply the most 
appropriate transfer-pricing method and requires information from comparable uncontrolled 
transactions to determine the arm’s length price. Tax authorities, in contrast, require such 
information to benchmark an MNC’s transfer price against comparable uncontrolled transactions 
and to thereby detect and challenge potentially aggressive income-shifting strategies (De 
Waegenaere et al. 2012; De Simone 2016; De Simone and Sansing 2018).  
The type of intra-firm transaction determines the extent of comparable information 
available to an MNC and the local tax authority and shapes how this information is distributed 
between the two parties. For intra-firm transactions including tangible goods or standardized 
services, external comparable information is readily observable (IMF et al. 2017). Therefore, the 
MNC and the tax authority have similar information sets to determine the arm’s length price and 
to assess the value of an intra-firm transaction.  
External comparable information to assess the value of royalty payments for patents, in 
contrast, is scarce because market prices for these payments are regularly unavailable (Blair-
Stanek 2015). Thus, the “true” economic value of these payments is ambiguous and the MNC 
and the local tax authority have incomplete information about the precise value of the intra-firm 
transaction.6 Yet, since the value of patents is often firm-specific and the owner of the patent 
                                                 
6 Prior literature documents comparable settings e.g., in emission taxation (Baron 1986). A regulator faces also 
information asymmetry under incomplete information in determining the economic costs of pollution. 
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possesses knowledge about the value drivers and the associated profit potential (Qiu and Wan 
2015; Gallemore et al. 2018). Consequently, the MNC has a more complete information set than 
the local tax authority, leading to information asymmetry between the two parties.  
The extent of asymmetric information varies with the amount of comparable information 
available to the local tax authority. If a small number of firms in an industry holds a large share 
of patents (i.e. patent concentration is high), external comparable information is limited and 
knowledge about the value drivers is concentrated within a small set of firms. Thus, high patent 
concentration reduces the set of external benchmarks available to the local tax authority and 
increases asymmetric information over how to value royalty payments. As the local tax authority 
lacks appropriate benchmarks to assess the arm’s length price, the MNC is able to justify a 
broader range of potential transfer prices (OECD 2017a; OECD 2015b BEPS Action 8; Mescall 
and Klassen 2018). 
We expect that tax-motivated income shifting increases in the level of information 
asymmetry. If asymmetric information is high, the MNC has more discretion in setting the arm’s 
length price. Moreover, the MNC is able to substantiate the determined transfer price with 
information on internal transactions, which is harder to verify for the local tax authority than 
information on external transactions. Consequently, the level of asymmetric information reduces 
the likelihood that the local tax authority might be able to detect and successfully challenge an 
aggressive transfer-pricing strategy, providing an incentive for more tax-motivated income 
shifting. Based on these arguments, our main hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is as follows: 
H1:  Tax-motivated income shifting via patents increases in the level of asymmetric 
information between the MNC and the local tax authority. 
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There are several reasons that we might not find the hypothesized relation. First, several 
countries adopted transfer-pricing documentation requirements to limit discretion in setting 
transfer prices and to enforce the arm’s length standard (OECD 2017a).7 Prior research shows 
that these requirements reduce cross-border income shifting (e.g., Klassen and Laplante 2012; 
Lohse and Riedel 2014; Beer and Loeprick 2015; Mescall and Klassen 2018). If transfer-pricing 
documentation requirements increase the information set of the local tax authority by revealing 
an MNC’s information about the value drivers and the profit potential associated with a patent, 
the likelihood of detecting and challenging aggressive transfer-pricing strategies could increase 
and we might not find a relation between asymmetric information and tax-motivated income 
shifting. Second, several countries recently tightened their tax enforcement (OECD 2017a). If 
these efforts specifically target affiliates of MNCs with high patent concentration, the likelihood 
that a local tax authority detects and successfully challenge an aggressive transfer-pricing 
strategy could increase and we might not find an association between information asymmetry 
and tax-motivated income shifting. Third, recent survey evidence suggests that many MNCs 
favor compliance with the arm’s length standard over tax aggressiveness (Klassen, Lisowsky, 
and Mescall 2017). Thus, if MNCs seek tax compliance or tax aggressiveness independent from 
the extent of asymmetric information, we might not find support for our hypothesis.  
                                                 
7 Based on guidelines by the OECD, the national frameworks include statutory requirements to provide supporting 
information for transfer prices set by an MNC that are coupled with substantial penalties for non-compliance. From 
1994 to 2019, the number of countries that implemented such requirements increased from five to more than 80. The 
majority of countries also apply penalties for non-compliance (Lohse and Riedel 2013; Deloitte 2019). 
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3. Research Design, Data, and Sample Selection 
3.1 Income-Shifting Model  
We base our research design on the income-shifting model developed by Hines and Rice 
(1994) and expanded by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). These models apply a Cobb-Douglas 
production function to estimate affiliate-level taxable income prior to income shifting as a 
function of capital, labor, and productivity. We apply the most recent extension by De Simone, 
Klassen, et al. (2017) to include unprofitable affiliates.8 Equation (1) depicts this model.  
 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛼𝑡  + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁(𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑁(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑡 +
𝛽6𝛥𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽7𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
The dependent variable, LN(1+ROA) is the natural logarithm of affiliate i’s return on assets 
(ROA) in year t. By adding 1 to ROA before taking logs, we include affiliates with a negative 
return on assets in year t, i.e. unprofitable affiliates (Claessens and Laeven 2004; De Simone et 
al. 2017). In line with prior research (Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Klassen and Laplante 2012; 
Markle 2016; De Simone 2016; Blouin et al. 2018), we use book income as a proxy for taxable 
income and calculate ROA as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets.9  
We include the logarithm of affiliate tangible fixed assets and affiliate compensation 
expense as proxies for capital and labor input. To measure productivity, we compute 
IndustryROA as the median ROA by country-industry-year (De Simone et al. 2017). We use all 
                                                 
8 We include unprofitable affiliates in our sample because prior literature suggests that current losses affect an MNC’s 
income-shifting behavior via patents. Hopland et al. (2018), for instance, find that royalty payments provide MNCs 
with flexibility to adjust income-shifting strategies and to exploit tax incentives associated with unprofitable affiliates.  
9 We use EBIT instead of pre-tax income because it is unaffected by intra-firm interest payments (Heckemeyer and 
Overesch 2017) allowing a cleaner identification of income shifting via patents. We explore income shifting via 
interest payments in supplemental tests (see Section 5.2).  
(1) 
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affiliates and independent firms available by two-digit NACE country-industry-year. LN(Age) is 
the natural logarithm of affiliate age, calculated as year t less the first year affiliate i appears in 
the database. Further, we include annual GDP growth in affiliate country c (GDPGrowth) and 
the annual percentage change in total sales of all affiliates and independent firms by two-digit 
NACE country-industry-year (ΔMarketSize) to control for profitability shocks at the affiliate 
country-level and the affiliate industry-level (De Simone et al. 2017). 
C is the tax incentive to shift income associated with affiliate i. Following Huizinga and 
Laeven (2008), we calculate C based on the weighted tax-rate differential of affiliate i relative to 
all affiliates of the same MNC in year t to reflect the income-shifting incentive of affiliate i 
relative to all other affiliates. Tax-rate differentials are based on statutory corporate income tax 
rates. As reflected in Equation (2), we weigh tax-rate differentials by total affiliate assets (K) to 
account for the costs of income shifting (Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Markle 2016).  
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  
1
(1−𝜏𝑖𝑡)
∗  
∑
𝐾𝑘𝑡
(1−𝜏𝑘𝑡)
∗(𝜏𝑖𝑡−𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
∑
𝐾𝑘,𝑡
(1−𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
 
Depending on the relative income-shifting incentive associated with affiliate i, C could 
take either positive or negative values. A higher (lower) value for C suggests that affiliate i is a 
relatively high-tax (low-tax) affiliate, implying a tax incentive to shift income to (from) affiliates 
with lower (higher) values of C. Therefore, a negative coefficient on 𝛽7 suggests that taxable 
income of affiliate i is sensitive to this income-shifting incentive, consistent with evidence for 
tax-motivated income shifting. The C measure varies across affiliates due to country-level 
differences in statutory corporate income tax rates and differences in the location of affiliates 
within an MNC. Further, changes in statutory corporate income tax rates lead to variation in C 
over time. We follow De Simone, et al. (2017) and include Loss, which is an indicator variable 
(2) 
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with the value of one if EBIT of affiliate i is less than zero. As income-shifting incentives might 
differ for unprofitable affiliates, we interact C with Loss.  
Finally, we include a series of fixed effects. First, we add affiliate country-fixed effects 
(𝛼𝑐) to control for time invariant country-level differences in tax regimes and institutions. 
Second, we include affiliate industry-fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) to capture time invariant differences in 
income-shifting opportunities, productivity, and profitability across industries. Third, we include 
year-fixed effects (𝛼𝑡) to absorb the effects of business cycles and economic shocks. We cluster 
standard errors by affiliate to account for serial correlation in the data (Petersen 2009).  
3.2 Research Design for Testing the Effect of Asymmetric Information 
To test our main hypothesis, we estimate the following regression model, extending 
Equation (1) in two ways:  
 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛼𝑡  + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝛽7𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶_𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶_𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽13𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐶_𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
First, we add C_Patents and its interaction with Loss to account for income-shifting 
incentives not captured by C. Several countries offer IP box regimes with preferential tax rates 
for income derived from patents (Evers et al. 2015).10 To obtain C_Patents, we re-calculate C for 
affiliate i using IP tax rates instead of statutory corporate income tax rates. We then subtract C to 
capture the incremental income-shifting incentive associated IP tax rates. The interpretation of 
this measure is consistent with C: a higher (lower) value for C_Patents indicates an incremental 
                                                 
10 Although the scope of IP box regimes varies across countries, all IP box regimes offer preferential tax rates on 
patent income. 
(3) 
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incentive to shift income to (from) other affiliates via patents. Thus, a negative coefficient on 𝛽8 
indicates that taxable income of affiliate i is sensitive to the incremental shifting incentive, which 
is again consistent with tax-motivated income shifting.  
Second, we include PatentConc as a measure for the extent of asymmetric information 
associated with patents held by an MNC. For affiliate i, we calculate the number of patents held 
by all domestic and foreign affiliates of the MNC in year t. We then divide this number by the 
sum of patents held by domestic and foreign affiliates of MNCs operating in the same country-
industry-year as affiliate i.11 As shown in Figure 1, this measure reflects the extent of patent 
concentration and is intended to capture information asymmetry associated with cross-border 
royalty payments from a non-patent holding affiliate (i.e. affiliate i) to a foreign patent-holding 
affiliate. We focus on outbound shifting incentives since external comparable information, and 
therefore the level of asymmetric information, is most critical for tax authorities assessing 
royalty payments of non-patent holding affiliates which threaten to erode the tax base of the 
affiliate country (OECD 2015b). 
PatentConc is based on the following intuition: if affiliate i belongs to an MNC that holds 
a small fraction of patents compared to other MNCs with affiliates operating in the same 
country-industry-year, the local tax authority has access to a large set of external comparable 
information. This leads to low information asymmetry over how to value royalty payments of 
affiliate i (panel A). In contrast, if affiliate i belongs to an MNC that holds a large fraction of 
patents, external comparable information for the local tax authority is scarce, resulting in high 
information asymmetry over how to value royalty payments of affiliate i (panel B).  
                                                 
11 We provide a numerical example in Appendix B.  
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By limiting PatentConc to affiliates of MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year, 
we measure the extent of asymmetric information of affiliate i relative to its industry peers. This 
rules out that differences in patenting strategies across industries might affect our measure (Hall 
et al. 2014). 12 Further, we focus on patents held by affiliates of MNCs because we are interested 
in asymmetric information associated with the valuation of cross-border royalty payments. 
Domestic independent firms could also receive royalty payments if they externally license their 
patents. Yet, these firms might substantially differ from affiliates of MNCs in terms of functions 
performed or risk borne, and it is therefore questionable whether they serve as an appropriate 
benchmark for the local tax authority when assessing the arm’s length price of cross-border 
royalty payments. Indeed, the degree of internationalization is a key criterion for tax authorities 
in identifying a set of comparable firms (OECD 2015; IMF et al. 2017, p. 29).13  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
To test our baseline hypothesis and to examine whether patent concentration is associated 
with tax-motivated income shifting, we interact PatentConc with C and C_Patents. If MNCs 
exploit asymmetric information to shift income via patents, we expect 𝛽13 and 𝛽14 to be 
negative. That is, the extent to which the reported profit of affiliate i is sensitive to income-
shifting incentives should increase in the level of patent concentration. As PatentConc is greater 
than zero only for affiliates of MNCs that hold patents, 𝛽13 and 𝛽14 additionally provide indirect 
evidence for tax-motivated income shifting via patents.  
                                                 
12 An alternative measure could use the fraction of patents in a specific patent class rather than industry-affiliation of 
the MNC. However, informal discussions with practitioners indicate that tax authorities audit MNCs based on their 
industry-affiliation.  
13 Nonetheless, our main inferences are unchanged when including independent firms operating in the same country-
industry-year as affiliate i in the calculation of PatentConc.  
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3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
We construct our sample by merging two distinct data sources. First, we obtain 
unconsolidated financial statement and ownership data for affiliates of MNCs from Bureau van 
Dijk’s Orbis database, covering the sample period 2008 to 2016. Second, we obtain patent data 
from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT.14 PATSTAT is maintained by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and it offers rich bibliographic patent data from more than 100 
patent offices worldwide.15 The available data includes information on patent owners, patent 
applications, patent grants, and patent citations. We apply Bureau van Dijk’s reverse search 
algorithm, taking into account the affiliate’s name and its country of residence, to merge 
PATSTAT with Orbis. This procedure links patent ownership from PATSTAT to the affiliates 
recorded in Orbis and provides insights into the locations of patent holdings within MNCs.  
Table 1 outlines our sample selection. We identify MNCs with affiliates in at least two 
different countries and require direct and indirect ownership links within the MNC to be greater 
than 50 percent.16 Due to data limitations and to be consistent with prior research (e.g., De 
Simone 2016; De Simone at al. 2017), we require the parent of the MNC and the foreign 
affiliates to be located in a European country.17 We also require non-missing NACE industry 
codes and positive values for total assets, tangible fixed assets, and compensation expense. These 
                                                 
14 We use the “Autumn 2017” edition of PATSTAT.  
15 The database covers patent applications and grants with patent offices in member states of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) and other major patent offices, such as the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
For more information, see https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/business/patstat.html#tab-1. 
16 One limitation of Orbis is that ownership information is stale and reflects the status of the last year in the dataset. 
This could lead to measurement error as we might classify an affiliate of a firm that became an MNC towards the end 
of the sample period as being an affiliate of an MNC throughout. Because income shifting requires a cross-border 
context, such ownership changes would bias against finding results. As a result, the effect sizes obtained from our 
regression models are likely to constitute lower bound estimates.  
17 Specifically, we limit our sample to affiliates located in the 28 member states of the European Union and in the four 
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The latter includes Switzerland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway, and Iceland. We relax this requirement when calculating the income-shifting incentive. That is, we take non-
European affiliates with data on total assets into account when calculating C and C_Patents for affiliate i.  
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requirements yield an initial sample of 163,865 affiliate-year observations that represent 28,733 
affiliates, belonging to 9,088 MNCs.  
As outlined in Table 1, we exclude affiliates of MNCs active in the banking or in the 
insurance industry because of distinct income-shifting incentives in these sectors (Merz and 
Overesch 2016). We follow De Simone et al. (2017) and require MNCs to be profitable as a 
group since consolidated losses could alter income-shifting incentives.18 We further exclude 
observations with missing values for EBIT and with values for LN(1+ROA) less than or equal to 
zero. Finally, we drop observations with insufficient data to calculate regression variables. Our 
sample covers 138,293 affiliate-year observations, representing 26,608 unique affiliates and 
8,489 unique MNCs. On average, we observe 5.2 observations per affiliate and the average MNC 
has 3.1 foreign affiliates.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the sample composition by country.19 We observe the largest number of 
affiliate-years for France, Italy, and Spain while the number is lowest for Ireland, Iceland, and 
Switzerland. In columns 2 and 3, we show information on corporate income tax rates and IP tax 
rates, respectively. Average corporate income tax rates vary across countries, ranging from 10 
percent in Bulgaria to 35 percent in Malta. Similarly, average IP tax rates range from 6 percent in 
Luxembourg to 30 percent in Germany. For 12 countries in our sample, the average IP tax rate 
deviates from the average corporate income tax rate. A deviation between two and 27 percentage 
                                                 
18 In line with De Simone et al. (2017), we calculate the consolidated return on sales using data for the affiliates in our 
sample. We drop MNCs with a negative return on sales in year t 
19 Due to our sample selection criteria, our final sample includes affiliates located in 27 countries. 
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points suggests that C based on corporate income tax rates does not fully capture the income-
shifting incentive associated with patents.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and the 
99th percentile to reduce the influence of outliers in the regression analyses. Panel A shows 
information for the full sample. The average affiliate reports earnings before interest and taxes of 
EUR 3.1 million (EBIT), a return on assets of 7.5 percent (ROA), tangible fixed assets of EUR 7 
million, and a compensation expense of 5.9 million. 17.1 percent of the affiliate-years exhibit a 
negative EBIT (Loss). The average affiliate holds 2.8 patents (PatStock) and belongs to an MNC 
owning 35.6 patents (SumPatents).20 Panels B and C present descriptive statistics for patent-
holding and non-patent-holding affiliates, respectively. 10.4 percent of the observations in our 
sample concern patent-holding affiliates (Panel B), which suggests that, within MNCs, patent 
holdings are concentrated in a relatively small number of affiliates. Patent-holding affiliates 
exhibit higher EBIT and higher compensation expense. They are also larger than non-patent-
holding affiliates (all p < 0.01; two-tailed). Both groups do not differ in their return on assets 
(p = 0.79; two-tailed). On average, these affiliates hold 27.3 patents with a standard deviation of 
121.3, consistent with few affiliates holding a relatively large number of patents.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 4 reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Correlations between our regression 
variables are generally consistent with prior research using unconsolidated financial statement 
data for European affiliates (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven 2008; De Simone et al. 2017). Further, C 
                                                 
20 PatStock is the number of granted patents held by affiliate i in year t. This includes all patents granted in the last 19 
years because patents normally protect intellectual property for 20 years. 
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and C_Patents are weakly correlated (ρ = 0.13), providing comfort that both measures capture 
distinct income-shifting incentives. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
4. Results 
4.1 Extension of the De Simone et al. (2017) Income-Shifting Model 
Before testing our main hypothesis, we extend the income-shifting model by De Simone et 
al. (2017) and include the incremental income-shifting incentive associated with IP boxes 
(C_Patents). We report results in Table 5. In column 1, we first estimate Equation (1) on our 
sample and find results consistent with De Simone et al. (2017). Estimated coefficients exhibit 
the identical sign and are comparable in magnitude. Most importantly, the coefficient on C is 
negative and significant (p < 0.01), consistent with evidence for tax-motivated income shifting. 
Further, the estimated coefficients on C (-0.097) and C*Loss (0.289) are similar to the estimates 
amounting to -0.088 and 0.251 in De Simone et al. (2017).21  
In columns 2 and 3, we include C_Patents and the interaction of C_Patents with Loss, 
respectively. While results for the initial variables are consistent with column 1, coefficients on 
C_Patents and C_Patents*Loss are insignificant in both columns (all p > 0.17). Thus, including 
C_Patents does not alter the general inferences drawn from the De Simone et al. (2017) model. 
These results also suggest that, on average, taxable income of the affiliates in our sample is not 
sensitive to the incremental income-shifting incentive induced by IP boxes.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
                                                 
21 The coefficients on C and C*Loss translate into a semi-elasticity at the mean ROA of -0.97 for profitable affiliates 
and +1.79 for unprofitable affiliates. These elasticities are slightly larger than estimates in De Simone et al. (2017).  
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4.2 Baseline Results: Asymmetric Information and Tax-Motivated Income Shifting via Patents 
We next test our baseline hypothesis and examine the relation between asymmetric 
information and income shifting via patents. We limit the sample to non-patent-holding affiliates 
since MNCs may use royalty payments to shift taxable income from non-patent-holding affiliates 
to their patent-holding counterparts. As noted above, external comparable information is most 
critical for local tax authorities assessing cross-border royalty payments of non-patent holding 
affiliates (OECD 2015b).  
Table 6 presents results of estimating Equation (3). In column 1, we again find a negative 
and significant coefficient on C (p < 0.01) while the coefficient on C_Patents is insignificant 
(p = 0.83). Consistent with H1, coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc are 
both negative and significant (p < 0.04). Thus, tax-motivated income shifting via patents 
increases with patent concentration. In column 2, we replace the continuous measure for patent 
concentration with an indicator variable taking the value of one for affiliates with patent 
concentration in the top sample quartile (HighPatentConc). The negative and significant 
coefficients on C*HighPatentConc and C_Patents*HighPatentConc (p < 0.08) again indicate 
more tax-motivated income shifting via patents for affiliates with high patent concentration.  
In economic terms, the coefficient estimates on C and C*PatentConc in column 1 imply a 
semi elasticity of -1.33; i.e. a one percent increase in C reduces the return on assets of the 
average affiliate in our sample by 1.33 percent.22 In this regard, a one standard deviation increase 
in PatentConc (0.162) leads to a semi elasticity of -1.67, implying a 25.6 percent change ([-1.67 / 
                                                 
22 We calculate the semi-elasticity following De Simone et al. (2017), assuming a one percent change in C: 
(exp[(coefficient on C +coefficient on C*PatentConc * Mean PatentConc) * Δ C + LN(mean ROA + 1)] – 1 – mean 
ROA) / mean ROA; (exp[(-0.087 + -0.144 * 0.042) * 0.01 + LN(0.075 + 1)] – 1 – 0.075) / 0.075 = -1.33. This result 
falls in the range of estimates provided by prior studies (see e.g., Dharmapala (2014) and Riedel (2018)). 
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-1.33] – 1) in the sensitivity of the average affiliate’s return on assets to the income-shifting 
incentive captured by C. For the incremental income-shifting incentive induced by IP boxes, a 
one standard deviation increase in PatentConc changes the semi elasticity from -0.01 to -0.16.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Taken together, the results in this section support our baseline hypothesis: tax-motivated 
income shifting increases with patent concentration. Thus, the level of information asymmetry 
between an MNC and the local tax authority over how to value royalty payments for transfer-
pricing purposes significantly facilitates tax-motivated income shifting via patents.  
4.3 The Moderating Effect of External Comparable Information 
Our baseline results suggest that asymmetric information over how to value royalty 
payments is a determinant of tax-motivated income shifting. In this section, we study whether 
other sources of information available to the local tax authority mitigate this association to 
support the argument that PatentConc captures asymmetric information associated with patents. 
Specifically, we test whether more external comparable information in the form of local patent-
holding affiliates mitigates the association between patent concentration and tax-motivated 
income shifting. Figure 2 illustrates our approach.  
As discussed in Section 2.1, when assessing an MNC’s transfer-pricing strategy, the local 
tax authority benchmarks the determined transfer price against comparable information from 
firms performing similar functions and bearing similar risks (De Simone 2016; OECD 2017a). 
Rather than benchmarking cross-border royalty payments, the local tax authority could compare 
the profit margins of foreign patent-holding affiliates to those of local patent-holding affiliates of 
other MNCs (OECD 2015; IMF et al. 2017). This could increase the likelihood of detecting and 
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successfully challenging an aggressive transfer-pricing strategy, diminishing the extent to which 
patent concentration is associated with tax-motivated income shifting.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
To test this conjecture, we define HighPatAffiliates as an indicator variable with the value 
of one if the share of patent-holding affiliates relative to all affiliates of MNCs operating in the 
country-industry-year of affiliate i is in the top quartile.23 In Equation (3), we then interact 
HighPatAffiliate with C, C_Patents, PatentConc, and their respective interactions.  
We present results in Table 7. For the continuous patent-concentration measure 
(column 1), coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc (p < 0.03) are again 
negative and significant. Coefficients on the triple interactions C*PatentConc*HighPatAffiliates 
and C_Patents*PatentConc*HighPatAffiliates are positive but insignificant (p > 0.25). However, 
for affiliates subject to high asymmetric information (column 2), the coefficients on both triple 
interactions are positive and significant (p < 0.04). These results suggest that more external 
comparable information in the form of local patent-holding affiliates mitigates the association 
between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting, in particular for affiliates 
subject to high asymmetric information. Further, since the effect of PatentConc varies with the 
extent of external comparable information available to the local tax authority, these results also 
suggest that our measure is likely to capture asymmetric information associated with patents. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
                                                 
23 Instead of only using the affiliates included in our primary sample, we calculate HighPatAffiliates based on all 
affiliates of MNCs available in the Orbis database. This alleviates concerns that differences in data availability across 
countries or industries might affect our inferences.  
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4.4 The Adoption of Transfer-Pricing Documentation Requirements 
The results in the previous section indicate that more external comparable information 
mitigates the relation between patent concentration and the extent to which MNCs shift income 
via patents. In this section, we examine whether tax-policy measures designed to curb tax-
motivated income shifting could achieve a similar effect. Specifically, we exploit the adoption of 
transfer-pricing documentation requirements, which prior research has shown to limit tax-
motivated income shifting (Lohse and Riedel 2013; Beer and Loeprick 2015). These rules 
require MNCs to provide the local tax authority with supporting documentation on the arm’s 
length transfer price and the underlying transactions. However, transfer-pricing documentation 
requirements are not directly designed to increase external comparable information and therefore 
may not be effective in mitigating the impact of asymmetric information.  
We collect country-level information on transfer-pricing documentation requirements from 
Lohse and Riedel (2013) and Beer and Loeprick (2015) and supplement this data with more 
recent information from EY Worldwide Transfer Pricing Guides. To isolate the effect of the 
adoption of transfer-pricing documentation requirements on tax-motivated income shifting, we 
create TPDocu, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if country c introduced a 
transfer-pricing documentation requirement in year t or t-1, and zero if the country did not alter 
its rules in these years, and include this variable in Equation (3).24 TPDocu is based on a two-
year window because Beer and Loeprick (2015) show that transfer-pricing documentation 
requirements become fully effective in the first two years after their adoption. We then interact 
TPDocu with C, C_Patents, PatentConc and their respective interactions. This research design 
                                                 
24 In our sample, 12 countries had documentation requirements in place for all sample years, 10 countries introduced 
documentation requirements, and 5 countries did not require any TP-related documentation.  
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compares the relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting in the two 
years after the adoption of transfer-pricing documentation requirements to all affiliate-years 
where documentation requirements remain unchanged.  
We present results in Table 8. In column 1, we first interact TPDocu with C and C_Patents 
to examine the unconditional effect of TPDocu on tax-motivated income shifting. As expected, 
we find a positive and significant coefficient on C*TPDocu (p = 0.08). The coefficient on 
C_Patents*TPDocu is positive but insignificant (p = 0.58). Consistent with prior research (Lohse 
and Riedel 2013; Beer and Loeprick 2015), these results suggest that transfer-pricing 
documentation requirements are associated with less tax-motivated income shifting on average.  
In column 2, we test whether the adoption of transfer-pricing documentation requirements 
mitigates the relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting. To this 
end, we interact TPDocu with C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc, respectively. The 
negative and significant coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc (all p < 0.04) 
again suggest that tax-motivated income shifting increases in patent concentration. However, 
while we find a positive and significant coefficient on C*PatentConc*TPDocu (p = 0.05), the 
coefficient on C_Patents*PatentConc*TPDocu is insignificant (p = 0.62). For affiliates subject 
to high information asymmetry (column 3), coefficients on C*HighPatentConc*TPDocu and 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc*TPDocu are both insignificant (p > 0.14). These results indicate 
that, although the adoption of transfer-pricing documentation requirements is associated with less 
income shifting on average, these measures have only a weak mitigating effect on the relation 
between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting.  
Taken together, the results in the last two sections suggest that while more external 
comparable information dampens tax-motivated income shifting via patents, requiring MNCs to 
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provide supporting documentation for their transfer-pricing strategies without directly increasing 
external comparable information is not an effective tax-policy tool in this regard.  
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
4.5 The Moderating Effect of Stronger Tax Enforcement 
Our baseline hypothesis is based on the argument that asymmetric information over how to 
value royalty payments lowers the likelihood that local tax authorities might detect and 
successfully challenge an aggressive transfer-pricing strategy, which facilitates tax-motivated 
income shifting via patents. If this is the theoretical mechanism underlying our results, we should 
expect an increase in the likelihood of detecting and challenging an MNC’s tax-positions to 
mitigate the association documented in our main tests.   
To examine this conjecture, we follow De Simone et al. (2019) and exploit increases in the 
level of tax enforcement in the affiliate country. Stronger tax enforcement is expected to raise the 
likelihood of detection and to reduce the extent to which patent concentration facilitates tax-
motivated income shifting via patents. In line with De Simone et al. (2019), we collect data on 
tax enforcement from OECD’s tax-administration surveys (OECD 2011; OECD 2013; OECD 
2015a; OECD 2017b). When then construct Enforcement as an indicator variable with the value 
of one if country c increased tax enforcement in the previous year, and zero otherwise. 
We measure tax enforcement in three ways: i) the value of completed tax assessments over 
total net revenue collections, ii) the percentage of staff used for tax audit and verification, and iii) 
the total tax administration expenditure over GDP (OECD 2011; OECD 2013; OECD 2015a; 
OECD 2017b). The first two proxies capture the efficiency and the effectiveness of tax 
enforcement in country c while the third proxy measures resources employed in the enforcement 
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process. Thus, an increase in the value of completed tax assessments and the percentage of staff 
used for tax audit and verification might indicate a higher level of actual tax enforcement. An 
increase in tax administration expenditure, in contrast, raises the perceived level of tax 
enforcement (Slemrod 2016; De Simone et al. 2019). We again include Enforcement in Equation 
(3) and interact this variable with C, C_Patents, PatentConc and their respective interactions. 
We present results in Table 9.25 In the first two columns, we measure Enforcement through 
the value of completed tax assessments. In column 1, we again find that patent concentration is 
associated with more tax-motivated income shifting. The positive and significant coefficients on 
the triple interactions C*PatentConc*Enforcement and C_Patents*PatentConc*Enforcement 
(p < 0.04) indicate that an increase in actual tax enforcement mitigates this relation. In column 2, 
we find similar results for affiliates subject to high information asymmetry. In columns 3 and 4, 
we measure Enforcement through staff used in tax audit and verification. The positive and 
significant coefficient on C_Patents*HighPatentConc*Enforcement (column 4; p = 0.03) 
supports the results in columns 1 and 2. In columns 5 and 6, we use total tax administration 
expenditure to measure Enforcement. While we again find that tax-motivated income shifting is 
increasing in patent concentration, a higher level of perceived tax enforcement does not alter this 
relation. Overall, these results suggest that stronger actual tax enforcement reduces the extent to 
which asymmetric information is associated with tax-motivated income shifting. These tests also 
indicate that our baseline results are due to asymmetric information lowering the likelihood that 
the local tax authority might detect and challenge an aggressive tax-position.  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
                                                 
25 In Table 9, the loss in sample size is due to the OECD enforcement data being unavailable for all sample years. 
Moreover, data availability varies across our three proxies, leading to different sample sizes for each test.  
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5. Robustness Tests and Supplementary Analyses  
5.1 Robustness Tests 
To assess the robustness of our baseline findings, we conduct several tests and report 
results in Table 10. First, we modify our measure for patent concentration, which assumes that 
asymmetric information increases in the relative number of patents held by an MNC. Aside from 
the number of patents, asymmetric information could also increase in the relative value of the 
patents held by an MNC. To test this, we follow Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and 
recalculate our measure using the number of patent citations as a proxy for patent value 
(PatentQualityConc). Consistent with our baseline results, coefficients on C*PatentQualityConc 
and C_Patents*PatentQualityConc (all p < 0.03) are negative and significant (column 1).  
Second, we use the corporate income tax rate in country c as a measure for income-shifting 
incentives. While C captures the incentive to shift income associated with affiliate i relative to all 
other affiliates belonging the same MNC, weighting tax-rate differentials by total assets raises 
concerns that changes in an affiliate’s asset base could impact our main results. Therefore, we 
replace C with the corporate income tax rate in country c (CTR).26 Consistent with tax-motivated 
income shifting, we expect the taxable income of affiliate i to decrease in the statutory tax rate. 
Results in column 2 support this expectation. Coefficients on CTR and CTR*PatentConc are both 
negative and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, patent concentration is associated with less (more) 
                                                 
26 We do not include the IP tax rate since non-patent-holding affiliates are unlikely to report taxable income subject 
to this rate. When adding the difference between the IP tax rate and the corporate income tax rate (CTR_Patents) to 
capture incremental income-shifting incentives associated with IP boxes, we find insignificant coefficients on 
CTR_Patents and CTR_Patents*PatentConc (untabulated; all p > 0.36). For patent-holding affiliates, however, 
CTR_Patents*PatentConc is negative and significant (p = 0.07), consistent with these affiliates reporting income 
subject to this rate in particular when information asymmetry is high. 
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income reported in high-tax (low-tax) affiliates. Corroborating our main findings, these results 
suggest that changes in an affiliate’s asset base are unlikely to drive our main results.  
Third, we modify our dependent variable and assess the sample selection underlying our 
empirical approach. We replace LN(1+ROA) with the natural logarithm of earnings before 
interest (LN(EBIT)) and pre-tax income (LN(PLBT)), respectively. This approach is consistent 
with the income-shifting model in Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and has been widely used by 
prior research (e.g., De Simone 2016; Markle 2016; Blouin et al. 2018). Since the natural 
logarithm is undefined for negative values, loss observations are excluded from the sample. 
When using LN(EBIT) as a dependent variable, we find a negative and significant coefficient on 
C*PatentConc (p < 0.01) in column 3 while the negative coefficient on C_Patents*PatentConc 
is marginally insignificant (p = 0.14). For LN(PLBT), both coefficients are negative and 
significant (column 4; p < 0.02). These results suggest that our findings are robust to different 
specifications of the income-shifting model and to excluding loss affiliates from the sample. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
5.2 Controlling for the Effect of Market Power on Tax-Motivated Income Shifting 
One concern with PatentConc is that our measure could be correlated with market power, 
i.e. affiliates of MNCs holding a large share of patents could also have high power in their local 
markets. Similar to asymmetric information associated with patents, the local tax authority might 
lack external comparable information if an MNC controls a significant share of the local market. 
Thus, instead of capturing the effect of asymmetric information, our results could be driven by 
income shifting associated with market power. To control for market power, we calculate 
MarketShare as total sales of affiliate i in year t divided by total sales of all firms in the same 
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country-industry-year.27 By including all firms in a country-industry-year, we measure the share 
of the local market controlled by affiliate i. We then interact MarketShare with C and C_Patents, 
respectively, and re-estimate Equation (3) for the full sample.  
We present results in Table 11.28 Consistent with our main results (Table 6, column 1), the 
coefficients on C*PatentConc and C_Patents*PatentConc are negative and significant (p < 0.07) 
and their magnitudes are comparable to our baseline estimates (column 1). The coefficients on 
C*MarketShare and C_Patents*MarketShare are negative but insignificant (p > 0.13). In column 
2, we obtain generally consistent results. The coefficient on C*HighPatentConc is negative and 
significant (p = 0.04) while the negative coefficient on C_Patents*HighPatentConc is marginally 
insignificant (p = 0.11). Overall, these results suggest that, after controlling for market power of 
affiliate i, we continue to find that patent concentration is associated with more tax-motivated 
income shifting. Thus, an affiliate’s market power is unlikely to drive our baseline findings. 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
5.3 Falsification Test: Asymmetric Information and Income Shifting via Debt  
If PatentConc captures asymmetric information associated with patents rather than general 
characteristics on an MNC, we should not observe a relation between our measure and tax-
motivated income shifting in a non-patent-related setting. To test this conjecture and to provide 
additional support for the validity of our measure, we examine tax-motivated income shifting via 
intra-firm debt. While interest payments on intra-firm debt allow MNCs to shift taxable income, 
the extent to which MNCs exploit this income-shifting channel should not vary with patent 
concentration. To this end, we replace the dependent variable with LN(1+FROA), defined as 
                                                 
27 The univariate correlation between PatentConc and MarketShare is 0.19 (p < 0.01).  
28 The slight loss in sample size in Table 11 is due to sales data being unavailable for some affiliates in our sample.  
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financial income of affiliate i in year t over total assets. This measure should capture income 
shifting via interest payments (Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017).  
Table 12 presents the results. In column 1, we again replicate the income-shifting model by 
De Simone et al. (2017) for the full sample.29 The coefficient on C is negative and significant 
(p < 0.01), consistent with evidence for tax-motivated income shifting via debt. In columns 2 
and 3, we interact C with PatentConc and HighPatentConc and estimate Equation (3) on the 
subsample of non-patent-holding affiliates. As expected, coefficients on C*PatentConc and 
C*HighPatentConc are insignificant in both columns (all p > 0.16). These results indicate that 
tax-motivated income shifting via debt is not related to patent concentration, providing support 
that our measure indeed captures asymmetric information associated with patents.  
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
5.4 Asymmetric Information and Inbound Shifting to Patent-Holding Affiliates  
In our main tests, we focus on non-patent-holding affiliates because PatentConc captures 
the incentive to shift income from non-patent-holding affiliates to foreign affiliates that hold 
patents. Thus, while our results so far provide evidence for outbound income shifting via patents, 
asymmetric information could also be relevant for an MNC when choosing a particular patent-
holding affiliate as a recipient for shifted income. Similar to the argument underlying our 
baseline hypothesis, we expect an MNC to have a greater incentive to shift income to an affiliate 
that holds a large fraction of patents compared to other MNCs operating in the same country-
industry-year. Also in this case, the local tax authority assessing intra-firm royalty payments 
                                                 
29 We do not include C_Patents in these tests because this variable captures income-shifting incentives induced by IP 
boxes, which do not apply to intra-firm interest payments. The sample in Table 12 is slightly larger because data on 
financial income is available for more affiliates than in our main sample. 
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from the non-patent-holding affiliate to the patent-holding affiliate lacks external comparable 
information. Thus, the sensitivity of a patent-holding affiliate’s taxable income to income-
shifting incentives should increase in the extent of asymmetric information. 
To test this conjecture, we slightly modify our measure for patent concentration. That is, 
for patent-holding affiliate i, we calculate PatentConcHold as the number of patents held by all 
domestic affiliates of the MNC in year t divided by the sum of patents held by domestic affiliates 
of other MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year. Thus, in contrast to PatentConc, we 
focus on patents held in the country-industry-year of the patent-holding affiliate (rather than all 
patents held by the MNC) to isolate asymmetric information associated with a particular affiliate. 
We then re-run Equation (3) with this measure for the subsample of patent-holding affiliates. We 
expect negative coefficients on C*PatentConcHold and C_Patents*PatentConcHold, consistent 
with tax-motivated income shifting increasing in the extent of asymmetric information. 
Table 13 presents the results. As expected, the coefficients on C*PatentConcHold and 
C_Patents*PatentConcHold are negative and significant in column 1 (p < 0.08). These results 
suggest that the sensitivity of a patent-holding affiliate’s taxable income to income-shifting 
incentives increases with asymmetric information. In column 2, we use an indicator variable with 
the value of one for patent-holding affiliates with patent concentration in the top sample quartile 
(HighPatentConcHold). Consistent with column 1, we find negative and significant coefficients 
on the interactions (p < 0.04). Collectively, these results suggest that the level of asymmetric 
information is not only associated with outbound income shifting but also with the extent to 
which MNCs shift income via patents to a particular patent-holding affiliate.  
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
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6. Conclusion 
We examine whether and to what extent asymmetric information between the MNC and 
the local tax authority is associated with tax-motivated income shifting via patents. Using 
unconsolidated financial statement data and information on patent holdings, we show that tax-
motivated income shifting increases in the share of patents held by an MNC relative to other 
MNCs operating in the same country-industry-year. These results indicate that high patent 
concentration, and thus a lack of comparable information for the local tax authority to assess an 
MNC’s transfer-pricing strategy, facilitates tax-motivated income shifting via patents.  
We also find that more external comparable information available to the local tax authority 
mitigates the observed relation between patent concentration and tax-motivated income shifting 
while more extensive transfer-pricing documentation requirements are less effective. Exploiting 
increases in actual tax enforcement, we show that the relation between asymmetric information 
and income shifting can be attributed to information asymmetry lowering the likelihood that 
local tax authorities might detect and successfully challenge an aggressive tax-position.  
Our study contributes to research on the determinants of tax-motivated income shifting by 
showing that the level of comparable information is an important driver of the extent to which 
MNCs shift income via patents. Our findings also indicate that industry landscapes in which 
MNCs operate tend to determine the level of asymmetric information and thus shape the 
magnitude of income shifted. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that the success of 
a tax-policy measure in curbing tax-motivated income shifting via patents critically depends on 
its ability to reduce information asymmetry by enlarging the set of comparable information or to 
credibly increase the likelihood of detecting and challenging aggressive tax-positions.   
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Dependent Variables 
LN(EBIT) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s EBIT in year t. 
  
LN(PLBT) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s PLBT in year t. 
  
LN(1+FROA) Natural logarithm of 1 plus affiliate i’s FROA in year t.  
  
LN(1+ROA) Natural logarithm of 1 plus affiliate i’s ROA in year t.  
  
Income-Shifting Incentive Variables 
C Income-shifting incentive of affiliate i based on statutory 
corporate income tax rates and following Huizinga and Laeven 
(2008):  
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  
1
(1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡)
∗  
∑
𝐾𝑘𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡)
∗ (𝜏𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
∑
𝐾𝑘,𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑘 ≠𝑖
 
C is calculated based on all tax-rate differentials between affiliate 
i and all other affiliates of the MNC in year t. We weight tax-rate 
differentials by total affiliate assets. Source: EY Corporate Tax 
Guides. 
  
C_Patents Incremental income-shifting incentive induced by preferential tax 
rates on IP income. First, we re-calculate C using preferential tax 
rates on IP income for affiliate i in year t. Second, we calculate 
C_Patents by subtracting C based on statutory corporate income 
tax rates from C based on preferential tax rates in IP income. 
Source: EY Corporate Tax Guides. 
  
CTR Statutory corporate income tax rate applicable in country c in year 
t. Source: EY Corporate Tax Guides. 
  
CTR_Patents Preferential tax rate on IP income in country c in year t less CTR 
in year t. Source: EY Corporate Tax Guides. 
  
Patent Concentration Measures 
PatentConc Patent concentration for affiliate i in year t calculated as the 
number of patents held by all affiliates of the MNC that holds 
affiliate i in year t divided by the sum of all patents held by MNCs 
with affiliates operating in the same country-industry-year as 
affiliate i. Industry is based on 2-digit NACE industry codes. 
Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
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PatentConcHold Patent concentration for patent-holding affiliate i in year t 
calculated as the number of patents held by all domestic affiliates 
of the MNC in year t divided by the sum of patents held by 
domestic affiliates of other MNCs operating in the same country-
industry-year. 
  
HighPatentConc Indicator variable with the value of one if PatentConc of affiliate i 
is in the top sample quartile, and zero otherwise.  
  
HighPatentConcHold Indicator variable with the value of one if PatentConcHold of 
affiliate i is in the top sample quartile of patent-holding affiliates, 
and zero otherwise. 
  
PatentQualityConc Patent concentration for affiliate i in year t based on the number of 
patent citations on the patents held by all affiliates of the MNC 
that holds affiliate i in year t divided by the number of patent 
citations on all patents held by MNCs with affiliates operating in 
the same country-industry-year as affiliate i. Industry is based on 
2-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
Patent Measures 
PatStock Number of granted patents held by affiliate i in year t. We 
combine all worldwide patents that were granted in the last 19 
years preceding year t. Source: PATSTAT. 
  
SumPatents Number of patents held by all affiliates of the MNC that holds 
affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
Independent Variables 
LN(TangibleAssets) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s TangibleAssets in year t. 
  
Tangible Assets Total fixed assets of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
LN(CompExpense) Natural logarithm of affiliate i’s CompExpense in year t. 
  
CompExpense Compensation expense of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
IndustryROA Country-industry-year median ROA for all companies in Orbis. 
Industry is based on 2-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis 
  
LN(Age) Natural logarithm of Age. 
  
Age Year t less the first year in which affiliate i appears in the Orbis 
database. Source: Orbis. 
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GDPGrowth Annual change in GDP from year t-1 to year t in affiliate country 
c. Source: World Bank national accounts data. 
  
ΔMarketSize Annual percentage change in total sales of all affiliates and 
independent firms by country-industry-year. Industry is based on 
2-digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis. 
  
Loss Indicator variable with the value of one if EBIT of affiliate i is less 
than zero, and zero otherwise. 
  
MarketShare Total sales of affiliate i in year t and divided by total sales of all 
firms in the same country-industry-year. Source: Orbis. 
  
Other Variables 
ROA EBIT of affiliate i in year t scaled by total assets of affiliate i in 
year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i in year t. Source: 
Orbis. 
  
PLBT Pre-tax profit of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
FROA Financial income of affiliate i in year t scaled by total assets of 
affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
Sales Sales of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets of affiliate i in year t. Source: 
Orbis. 
  
Total Assets Total assets of affiliate i in year t. Source: Orbis. 
  
Partitioning Variables 
HighPatAffiliates Indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of patent-
holding affiliates of MNCs to all affiliates of MNCs in a country-
industry-year is in the top sample quartile. Industry is based on 2-
digit NACE industry codes. Source: Orbis and PATSTAT. 
  
TPDocu Indicator variable with the value of one if country c adopted a 
transfer-pricing documentation requirement in years t or t-1 and 
zero if no change in transfer-pricing documentation requirement 
occurred in years t and t-1. Source: Lohse and Riedel (2013), Beer 
and Loeprick (2015), EY Worldwide Transfer Pricing Guides. 
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Enforcement First, indicator variable with the value of one if country c 
experienced an increase in the value of completed tax assessments 
over total net revenue collections in the previous year (i.e. from 
year t-2 to t-1), and zero otherwise. Second, indicator variable 
with the value of one if country c experienced an increase in the 
percentage of staff used for tax audit and verification in the 
previous year. Third, indicator variable with the value of one if 
country c experienced an increase in overall tax administration 
expenditure scaled by GDP in the previous year. Source: OECD 
(2010, 2013, 2015, 2017). 
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APPENDIX B: NUMERICAL EXAMPLE FOR PATENTCONC 
Figure 1 illustrates our approach to measure PatentConc as a proxy for the level of 
asymmetric information between an MNC and the local tax authority over how to value royalty 
payments. In this section, we provide a numerical example for how to calculate PatentConc for 
the German affiliate of MNC 1 (hereafter, affiliate i) in Figure 1. We assume that German 
affiliates of the other MNCs displayed in Figure 1 (i.e. MNCs 2-4 in panel A and MNC 2 in 
panel B) operate in the same 2-digit NACE industry as affiliate i.  
We calculate PatentConc for affiliate i as the sum of patents held by all domestic and 
foreign affiliates of MNC 1 divided by the sum of patents held by all domestic and foreign 
affiliates of MNCs with affiliates operating in the same country-industry-year (CIY) as affiliate i, 
including the number of patents held by MNC 1. Thereby, we obtain the share of patents owned 
by MNC 1 relative to other MNCs with affiliates operating in the same CIY as affiliate i. In both 
panels of Figure 1, the sum of patents held by MNCs with affiliates operating in the same CIY as 
affiliate i is equal to four. In the case of low information asymmetry (panel A), MNC 1 holds one 
patent. As a result, PatentConc of affiliate i is equal to 0.25 (= 1 / (1+3)). In the case of high 
information asymmetry (panel B), MNC 1 holds three patents. As a result, PatentConc of 
affiliate i is equal to 0.75 (= 3 / (3+1)). By calculating the share of patents held by affiliates of an 
MNC relative to MNCs with affiliates operating in the same CIY, PatentConc is constrained 
between zero and one. We summarize this example in the table below.  
Information Asymmetry  Low  High 
Σ of Patents MNC 1 1  3 
Σ of Patents other MNCs in same CIY 3  1 
Σ (Patents in CIY) 4  4 
PatentConc = Σ of Patents MNC 1 / Σ of Patents in same CIY 0.25 
 
0.75 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1: Measuring Information Asymmetry 
Panel A: Low Information Asymmetry 
 
 
Panel B: High Information Asymmetry 
 
 
Note: This figure illustrates our approach to measure patent concentration (PatentConc) as our proxy for the level of 
asymmetric information between the MNC and the local tax authority. Assume that the local tax authority requires 
external comparable information to assess the arm’s length price set by MNC 1 on cross-border royalty payments 
between its affiliates. In panel A, patent concentration is low because patents are distributed across several MNCs 
with affiliates operating in the same country-industry-year as MNC 1. The local tax authority has access to a large set 
of external comparable information from other affiliates of MNCs to assess the arm’s length price. This leads to low 
information asymmetry over how to value royalty payments of MNC 1. In panel B, patent concentration is high 
because patents are concentrated in MNC 1 relative to other MNCs with affiliates operating in the same country-
industry year. The local tax authority lacks external comparable information from other affiliates of MNCs to assess 
the arm’s length price. This leads to high information asymmetry over how to value royalty payments of MNC 1.  
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Figure 2: External Comparable Information 
 
 
Note: This figure illustrates our approach to capture external comparable information available to the local tax 
authority when assessing the arm’s length price set by MNC1 on cross-border royalty payments between its affiliates. 
In addition to cross-border royalty payments (i.e., MNC2), the local tax authority could also compare the profit 
margins of foreign affiliates to those of local patent-holding affiliates of other MNCs (i.e., MNC3). This might reduce 
information asymmetry over how to value royalty payments with respect to MNC 1.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Affiliate-Years 
European affiliate-years in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database with at least one 
foreign affiliate located in another European country, non-missing 
NACE industry codes, and positive values for total assets, tangible fixed 
assets and compensation expense (sample period: 2008-2016) 
163,865 
Less: Affiliates of MNCs operating in the banking or the insurance industry 
(2-digit NACE codes: 64, 65, and 66) 
(2,148) 
Less: Affiliate-years of MNCs with negative return on sales  (20,873) 
Less: Affiliate-years with missing values for EBIT and with values for 
LN(1+ROA) less than or equal to zero 
(566) 
Less: Affiliate-years with missing data for computing independent variables (1,985) 
Final Sample 138,293 
Note: This table shows the sample selection. We obtain unconsolidated financial statement data for foreign 
affiliates from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. 
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Table 2: Sample Composition by Country 
Country Affiliate-Years 
Mean  
Corporate Tax Rate 
Mean 
IP Tax Rate 
Austria 2,602 0.25 0.25 
Belgium 10,963 0.34 0.07 
Bulgaria 708 0.10 0.10 
Czech Republic 6,218 0.19 0.19 
Denmark 104 0.24 0.24 
Estonia 1,350 0.21 0.21 
Finland 4,776 0.23 0.23 
France 19,254 0.33 0.16 
Germany 12,118 0.30 0.30 
Hungary 2,452 0.19 0.09 
Iceland 41 0.19 0.19 
Ireland 3 0.13 0.10 
Italy 18,278 0.31 0.29 
Latvia 52 0.15 0.15 
Luxembourg 745 0.29 0.06 
Malta 32 0.35 0.12 
Netherlands 540 0.25 0.06 
Norway 5,870 0.27 0.27 
Poland 5,721 0.19 0.19 
Portugal 6,788 0.24 0.20 
Romania 4,228 0.16 0.16 
Slovakia  3,463 0.21 0.21 
Slovenia 1,356 0.18 0.18 
Spain 18,019 0.29 0.14 
Sweden 10,197 0.24 0.24 
Switzerland 41 0.18 0.12 
United Kingdom 849 0.24 0.18 
All Countries 138,293 0.23 0.17 
Note: This table presents the sample composition by country. The sample includes 138,293 affiliate-
year observations over the sample period 2008-2016. Column 1 presents the number of affiliate-years. 
Column 2 presents the average statutory corporate income tax rate and column 3 the average IP tax 
rate.   
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 SD 
EBIT 138,293 3,082,883 55,000 395,000 1,564,000 42,753,300 
ROA 138,293 0.075 0.014 0.057 0.131 0.135 
LN(1+ROA) 138,293 0.065 0.014 0.055 0.123 0.128 
TangibleAssets 138,293 7,045,321 103,000 740,000 4,056,000 20,896,530 
CompExpense 138,293 5,860,280 626,000 1,804,000 4,993,000 12,607,610 
LN(TangibleAssets) 138,293 6.434 4.635 6.607 8.308 2.561 
LN(CompExpense) 138,293 7.461 6.439 7.498 8.516 1.628 
IndustryROA 138,293 0.038 0.020 0.037 0.055 0.026 
LN(Age) 138,293 1.430 1.099 1.609 1.946 0.653 
GDPGrowth 138,293 -0.008 -0.078 0.011 0.046 0.083 
ΔMarketSize 138,293 0.012 -0.066 0.009 0.073 0.123 
Loss 138,293 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.376 
C 138,293 -0.008 -0.008 0.001 0.010 0.050 
C_Patents 138,293 -0.004 -0.019 0.000 0.012 0.074 
PatentConc 138,293 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.168 
PatStock 138,293 2.849 0.000 0.000 0.000 40.035 
SumPatents 138,293 35.622 0.000 0.000 5.000 230.668 
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Panel B: Patent-Holding Affiliates (PatStock > 0) 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 SD 
EBIT 14,412 10,682,310 455,500 1,913,000 6,103,000 77,282,440 
ROA 14,412 0.076 0.023 0.059 0.119 0.102 
LN(1+ROA) 14,412 0.068 0.022 0.057 0.112 0.096 
TangibleAssets 14,412 17,919,270 1,250,000 5,453,500 16,493,000 33,040,140 
CompExpense 14,412 16,401,390 3,044,000 7,639,000 19,524,000 21,687,950 
LN(TangibleAssets) 14,412 8.319 7.131 8.604 9.711 2.074 
LN(CompExpense) 14,412 8.908 8.021 8.941 9.879 1.380 
IndustryROA 14,412 0.047 0.030 0.043 0.066 0.026 
LN(Age) 14,412 1.498 1.099 1.609 1.946 0.626 
GDPGrowth 14,412 -0.009 -0.083 0.011 0.046 0.079 
ΔMarketSize 14,412 0.008 -0.072 0.006 0.073 0.123 
Loss 14,412 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.316 
C 14,412 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.011 0.028 
C_Patents 14,412 0.008 -0.004 0.001 0.016 0.060 
PatentConc 14,412 0.095 0.002 0.012 0.070 0.208 
PatStock 14,412 27.341 2.000 5.000 16.000 121.289 
SumPatents 14,412 69.727 3.000 10.000 40.000 259.430 
 
Panel C: Non-Patent-Holding Affiliates (PatStock = 0) 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 SD 
EBIT 123,881 2,198,785*** 45,000 333,000***    1,275,000 36,581,430 
ROA 123,881 0.075    0.013 0.056***    0.132 0.138 
LN(1+ROA) 123,881 0.064*** 0.013 0.055***    0.124 0.132 
TangibleAssets 123,881 5,780,274*** 85,000 586,000***    3,096,000 18,577,340 
CompExpense 123,881 4,633,954*** 558,000 1,541,000***    4,054,000 10,406,500 
LN(TangibleAssets) 123,881 6.215*** 4.443 6.373***    8.038 2.521 
LN(CompExpense) 123,881 7.293*** 6.324 7.340***    8.307 1.571 
IndustryROA 123,881 0.037*** 0.018 0.036***    0.054 0.026 
LN(Age) 123,881 1.422*** 1.099 1.609***    1.946 0.656 
GDPGrowth 123,881 -0.008  -0.078 0.011    0.046 0.083 
ΔMarketSize 123,881 0.013*** -0.065 0.010***    0.073 0.123 
Loss 123,881 0.178*** 0.000 0.000***    0.000 0.382 
C 123,881 -0.010*** -0.011 0.000***    0.010 0.051 
C_Patents 123,881 -0.005*** -0.022 0.000***    0.012 0.076 
PatentConc 123,881 0.042*** 0.000 0.000***   0.002 0.162 
PatStock 123,881 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***    0.000 0.000 
SumPatents 123,881 31.654*** 0.000 0.000***    3.000 226.754 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 138,293 
affiliate-year observations over the sample period 2008-2016. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for patent-holding 
affiliates (14,412 affiliate-year observations) and panel C for non-patent-holding affiliates (123,811 affiliate-year 
observations). We conduct a two-sample t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) to compare means (medians) between panels B 
and C. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4: Correlation Table  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) LN(1+ROA) 1.000           
(2) LN(TangibleAssets) -0.061 1.000          
(3) LN(CompExpense) 0.037 0.588 1.000         
(4) IndustryROA 0.111 0.014 0.195 1.000        
(5) LN(Age) 0.001 0.029 0.077 -0.127 1.000       
(6) GDPGrowth 0.026 0.004 0.006 0.118 -0.224 1.000      
(7) ΔMarketSize 0.039 0.004 -0.008 0.135 -0.434 0.381 1.000     
(8) Loss -0.622 -0.050 -0.098 -0.077 -0.037 -0.013 -0.014 1.000    
(9) C -0.031 0.020 0.176 0.071 0.034 -0.040 -0.060 -0.014 1.000   
(10) C_Patents 0.007 0.010 0.056 0.060 0.012 -0.013 -0.027 -0.015 0.132 1.000  
(11) PatentConc -0.018 0.090 0.072 -0.035 -0.033 0.017 0.026 0.034 -0.135 -0.053 1.000 
Note: This table presents univariate Pearson correlation coefficients. Bold coefficients denote significance at the 1% level.   
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Table 5: Extension of the De Simone et al. (2017) Income-Shifting Model 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(TangibleAssets)  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LN(CompExpense)  0.003***  0.003***  0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IndustryROA  0.217***  0.218***  0.218*** 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
LN(Age)  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
GDPGrowth  0.022**  0.022**  0.022** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
ΔMarketSize  0.005  0.005  0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
C  -0.097***  -0.105***  -0.101*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
C_Patents    -0.009  -0.003 
    (0.007)  (0.008) 
Loss  -0.208***  -0.208***  -0.208*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
C*Loss  0.289***  0.289***  0.269*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
C_Patents*Loss      -0.026 
            (0.019) 
Country-FE  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y 
N  138,293  138,293  138,293 
Adjusted R²  0.419   0.419   0.419 
Note: This table presents regression results for extending the income-shifting model 
by DeSimone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017) on the full sample of 138,293 affiliate-
year observations. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. All columns include 
country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6: Patent Concentration and Income Shifting   
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  
   (1)  (2)  
C  -0.087***  -0.084***  
  (0.016)  (0.017)  
C_Patents  0.002  0.003  
  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Loss  -0.211***  -0.211***  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  
C*Loss  0.253***  0.252***  
  (0.032)  (0.032)  
C_Patents*Loss  -0.030  -0.030  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  
PatentConc  -0.010**    
  (0.004)    
C*PatentConc  -0.144***    
  (0.050)    
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.064**    
  (0.031)    
HighPatentConc    -0.002  
    (0.002)  
C*HighPatentConc    -0.071**  
    (0.032)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConc   -0.035*  
        (0.020)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Country-FE  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  123,881  123,881  
Adjusted R²  0.425   0.425   
Note: This table presents regression results for the relation between patent 
concentration and tax-motivated income shifting via patents. All columns 
include the subsample of non-patent-holding affiliates (123,811 affiliate-year 
observations). The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as 
earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. All 
columns include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 7: High External Comparable Information 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA) 
   (1)  (2) 
C  -0.087***  -0.082*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018) 
C_Patents  0.002  0.003 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Loss  -0.211***  -0.211*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
C*Loss  0.252***  0.251*** 
  (0.032)  (0.032) 
C_Patents*Loss  -0.030  -0.030 
  (0.020)  (0.020) 
C*PatentConc  -0.173***   
  (0.055)   
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.079**   
  (0.035)   
C*PatentConc*HighPatAffiliates  0.154   
  (0.135)   
C_Patents*PatentConc*HighPatAffiliates  0.076   
  (0.079)   
C*HighPatentConc    -0.114*** 
    (0.037) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc    -0.058** 
    (0.025) 
C*HighPatentConc*HighPatAffiliates    0.170** 
    (0.073) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc*HighPatAffiliates    0.092** 
        (0.043) 
Additional Controls  Y  Y 
Country-FE  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y 
N  123,881  123,881 
Adjusted R²   0.425   0.425 
Note: This table presents regression results for the moderating effect of high external 
comparable information on tax-motivated income shifting via patents. All columns include 
the subsample of non-patent-holding affiliates (123,811 affiliate-year observations). The 
dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes of 
affiliate i divided by total assets. All columns include country, industry, and year fixed-
effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Adoption of Transfer-Pricing Documentation Requirements 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
C  -0.097***  -0.089***  -0.086*** 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
C_Patents  -0.002  0.002  0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Loss  -0.211***  -0.211***  -0.211*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
C*Loss  0.251***  0.253***  0.252*** 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
C_Patents*Loss  -0.030  -0.030  -0.030 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
C*PatentConc    -0.160***   
    (0.051)   
C_Patents*PatentConc    -0.067**   
    (0.032)   
C*TPDocu  0.057*  0.038  0.041 
  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
C_Patents*TPDocu  0.008  0.004  0.002 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
C*PatentConc*TPDocu    0.223**   
    (0.113)   
C_Patents*PatentConc*TPDocu    0.036   
    (0.071)   
C*HighPatentConc      -0.080** 
      (0.032) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc      -0.039* 
      (0.021) 
C*HighPatentConc*TPDocu      0.120 
      (0.082) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc*TPDocu      0.053 
            (0.042) 
Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y 
Country-FE  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y 
N  123,881  123,881  123,881 
Adjusted R²   0.425   0.425   0.425 
Note: This table presents regression results for the moderating effect of the adoption of 
transfer-pricing documentation requirements on tax-motivated income shifting via patents. 
All columns include non-patent-holding affiliates. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). 
ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. All 
columns include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 9: Increase in Tax Enforcement 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)    LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)    LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA) 
   (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)    (5)   (6) 
Enforcement  Completed Tax Assessments    Staff Usage for Verification    Tax Administration Expenditure 
C  -0.064**  -0.059**    -0.082***  -0.081***    -0.082***  -0.081*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)    (0.028)  (0.028)    (0.020)  (0.020) 
C_Patents  0.026**  0.025**    0.013  0.017    0.005  0.005 
  (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.010)  (0.010) 
Loss  -0.195***  -0.195***    -0.197***  -0.197***    -0.205***  -0.205*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.002)  (0.002) 
C*Loss  0.198***  0.197***    0.237***  0.235***    0.255***  0.254*** 
  (0.043)  (0.043)    (0.057)  (0.057)    (0.037)  (0.037) 
C_Patents*Loss  -0.038  -0.039    -0.000  0.000    -0.043*  -0.042* 
  (0.029)  (0.029)    (0.034)  (0.034)    (0.023)  (0.023) 
C*PatentConc  -0.195**      -0.285***      -0.164**   
  (0.080)      (0.104)      (0.068)   
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.070      -0.213***      -0.076*   
  (0.047)      (0.070)      (0.040)   
C*Enforcement  0.002  0.007    -0.014  -0.018    -0.009  -0.011 
  (0.022)  (0.023)    (0.030)  (0.030)    (0.019)  (0.020) 
C_Patents*Enforcement  0.002  -0.004    -0.016  -0.021    0.000  0.003 
  (0.012)  (0.012)    (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.011)  (0.011) 
C*PatentConc*Enforcement  0.191**      0.203      0.004   
  (0.092)      (0.152)      (0.082)   
C_Patents*PatentConc*Enforcement  0.162***      0.163      0.070   
  (0.055)      (0.104)      (0.048)   
C*HighPatentConc    -0.099**      -0.123*      -0.080** 
    (0.047)      (0.063)      (0.039) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc    -0.022      -0.135***      -0.033 
    (0.033)      (0.041)      (0.024) 
C*HighPatentConc*Enforcement    0.060      0.104      0.049 
    (0.052)      (0.080)      (0.049) 
C_Patents*HighPatentConc*Enforcemen
t 
   0.132***      0.115**      0.021 
        (0.035)         (0.053)         (0.031) 
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Additional Controls  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Country-FE  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y     Y   Y     Y   Y 
N  41,632  41,632    22,409  22,409    78,937  78,937 
Adjusted R²   0.422   0.422     0.409   0.409     0.423   0.423 
Note: This table presents regression results for the moderating effect of an increase in tax enforcement on tax-motivated income shifting via patents. In 
columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) [5 and 6], Enforcement is an indicator variable with the value of one if country c experienced an increase in the value of completed 
tax assessments (staff usage for verification) [overall tax administration expenditure]. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. All columns include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 10: Robustness Tests 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)
A) 
 LN(1+ROA)  LN(EBIT)  LN(PLBT) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
C  -0.085***    0.100  -0.197 
  (0.016)    (0.229)  (0.262) 
C_Patents  0.002    0.188  0.232* 
  (0.009)    (0.123)  (0.138) 
CTR    -0.114***     
    (0.032)     
Loss  -0.211***  -0.316***     
  (0.002)  (0.008)     
C*Loss  0.252***       
  (0.032)       
C_Patents*Loss  -0.030       
  (0.020)       
CTT*Loss    0.038***     
    (0.013)     
PatentQualityConc  -0.008*       
  (0.004)       
C*PatentQualityConc  -0.152***       
  (0.051)       
C_Patents*PatentQualityCo
nc 
 -0.072**       
  (0.032)       
PatentConc    0.038***  0.028  0.135* 
    (0.013)  (0.066)  (0.072) 
CTR*PatentConc    -0.167***     
    (0.052)     
C*PatentConc      -2.230***  -2.294** 
      (0.829)  (0.900) 
C_Patents*PatentConc      -0.781  -1.444** 
      (0.530)  (0.587) 
Additional Controls   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Country-FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y   Y 
N  123,881  123,881  101,654  99,380 
Adjusted R²   0.425   0.426   0.486   0.440 
Note: This table presents regression results for robustness tests. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is 
LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. In column 3, 
the dependent variable is LN(EBIT). In column 4, the dependent variable is LN(PLBT). All columns include country, 
industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 11: Controlling for Market Power   
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  
   (1)  (2)  
C  -0.081***  -0.078***  
  (0.017)  (0.017)  
C_Patents  0.005  0.006  
  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Loss  -0.212***  -0.212***  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  
C*Loss  0.245***  0.244***  
  (0.032)  (0.032)  
C_Patents*Loss  -0.035*  -0.035*  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  
PatentConc  -0.009**    
  (0.004)    
C*PatentConc  -0.122**    
  (0.051)    
C_Patents*PatentConc  -0.058*    
  (0.032)    
MarketShare  0.013  0.013  
  (0.027)  (0.027)  
C*MarketShare  -0.774  -0.760  
  (0.511)  (0.511)  
C_Patents*MarketShare  -0.441  -0.457  
  (0.321)  (0.325)  
HighPatentConc    -0.002  
    (0.002)  
C*HighPatentConc    -0.067**  
    (0.033)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConc   -0.034  
        (0.021)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Country-FE  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  118,805  118,805  
Adjusted R²  0.426   0.426   
Note: This table presents regression results for tests that control for market 
power. The dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. All columns 
include country, industry, and year fixed-effects. We report 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 12: Patent Concentration and Income Shifting via Debt 
Dependent Variable  LN(1+FROA)   LN(1+FROA)  LN(1+FROA) 
   (1)   (2)  (3) 
C  -0.014***   -0.017***  -0.017*** 
  (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
Loss  -0.032***   -0.032***  -0.032*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
C*Loss  0.034***   0.039***  0.039*** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
PatentConc     -0.001   
     (0.001)   
C*PatentConc     -0.013   
     (0.010)   
HighPatentConc       -0.001 
       (0.000) 
C*HighPatentConc       -0.008 
              (0.006) 
Additional Controls  Y   Y  Y 
Country-FE  Y   Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y   Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y     Y   Y 
N  138,595   124,169  124,169 
Adjusted R²   0.353     0.347   0.347 
Note: This table presents regression results for falsification tests examining the relation between 
patent concentration and income shifting via debt. Column 1 presents results for the replication 
of the income-shifting model by DeSimone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017) based on the full 
sample (138,595 affiliate-year observations). Columns 2 and 3 present results for the relation 
between patent concentration and debt shifting based on the subsample of non-patent-holding 
affiliates (124,169 affiliate-year observations). The dependent variable is LN(1+FROA). FROA 
is defined as financial income of affiliate i divided by total assets. All columns include country, 
industry, and year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 13: Patent Concentration and Patent-Holding Affiliates   
Dependent Variable  LN(1+ROA)  LN(1+ROA)  
   (1)  (2)  
C  -0.002  -0.042  
  (0.072)  (0.069)  
C_Patents  0.012  0.008  
  (0.026)  (0.025)  
Loss  -0.166***  -0.166***  
  (0.005)  (0.005)  
C*Loss  0.212  0.207  
  (0.155)  (0.155)  
C_Patents*Loss  -0.017  -0.017  
  (0.052)  (0.052)  
PatentConcHold  -0.004    
  (0.006)    
C*PatentConcHold  -0.622***    
  (0.175)    
C_Patents*PatentConcHold  -0.133*    
  (0.077)    
HighPatentConcHold    -0.002  
    (0.004)  
C*HighPatentConcHold    -0.459***  
    (0.147)  
C_Patents*HighPatentConcHold    -0.118**  
        (0.057)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Country-FE  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  14,411  14,411  
Adjusted R²  0.383   0.382   
Note: This table presents regression results for the relation between patent 
concentration and tax-motivated income shifting via patents. All columns include the 
subsample of patent-holding affiliates (14,412 affiliate-year observations). The 
dependent variable is LN(1+ROA). ROA is defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes of affiliate i divided by total assets. All columns include country, industry, and 
year fixed-effects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
affiliate in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
